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THESE REMARKS ABOUT THE CONCEPT of region are intended to be neither
polemical nor definitive. They pose questions to which I do not pretend to have ready
answers. They are inconclusive. All that I am convinced of is that there should be new
places to talk about, and new discussions focusing on, such questions. And I should
start off from being up-front about the Gramscian assumptions that have shaped my
outlook, my own ambiguous identity as a scholar (but not a resident) of this region,
and my own involvement in some of the positions on “region” I intend to probe.
The preliminary programme of this conference suggests the tremendous vitality
and diversity of scholarship in Atlantic Canada.1 This is a conference that reflects its
day. A rough tabulation, based on the preliminary programme, suggests that of the 42
papers destined for this conference, no fewer than 15 directly reflect the emergence of
gender as a category of analysis and of women as important subjects in history. A
further six probe minority identities, those of race and ethnicity (four) and those of
religion (two). A further ten look at economic history, most with a particular focus on
local communities; and a further eight might loosely be described as studies in local
state-formation and official culture. One cannot judge in advance how any of these
themes will be developed at our workshop, but it seems possible to say that this is
emphatically a 1990s agenda, placing emphasis on gender, ethnicity and community,
rather than on, say, such 1970s and early-1980s topics as regional underdevelopment,
class conflict and the position of the Atlantic Provinces within Confederation. We will
be hearing a lot about Nova Scotia (19 papers), something about Newfoundland and
Labrador (seven), New Brunswick (four) and Prince Edward Island (two); only four
papers locate themselves within “Atlantic Canada”, and only one within the
“Maritimes”. This is a pluralistic, perhaps even diffuse, set of topics; the old
narratives of nation-building, the coalesence of regional grievance, the development
of underdevelopment and the making of working-class consciousness all recede, and
new stories of identities and ideals are now on the agenda. There is evidence here of
a certain skepticism about the models, master narratives, grand theories and universal
assumptions that appeared to structure earlier work, in this region as elsewhere.
Contrary perhaps to your expectations, and contrary to the positions taken by
numerous of my labour-history and neo-Marxist friends and relations, I am not here
to argue that either this topical heterogeneity or this skepticism towards the older
narrative frameworks are mistakes. Rather, I see them both as “moments” in the
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development of regional historiography, as new ways of interrogating a past that will
always, this side of eternity, elude a decisive and final theorization. In many ways, this
opening up of the infinite diversity of the past, these long-suppressed voices, is a
continuation of, not a break with, the social-history revolution of the 1960s and 1970s,
and, perhaps at future Atlantic Canada Workshops, other marginalized voices — of
gays and lesbians, of prisoners, of the First Nations, for example — might be more
strongly present than they are here. It is not difficult for a Gramscian to applaud the
politics of inclusion which has indirectly led to this new pattern. This ACW
programme signals, perhaps unintentionally and perhaps not, a revolution in the
paradigms through which we have made history out of the past. This moment seems,
in many ways, a good one.
At the same time, this multiplication of subject-positions, epistemologies and
methodologies places a question mark over the very concept of an “Atlantic Canada”
whose construction we might meaningfully undertake at an Atlantic Canada
Workshop. The sense that the past can be explored in completely new ways, using
such categories (among others) as gender, ethnicity, race, age, sexual orientation and
the environment, while liberating “history” from what had come to seem its outdated
unilinear narratives of “development”, seems to deliver us into a no less paralyzing
experience of infinity. Every event in the past can be made part of a different
interpretation, and these patterns of interpretation, each claiming to represent the
whole, can leave us with a series of hermetically sealed parallel universes. Academic
peace is achieved, after a fashion, by careful boundary maintenance. But the price tag
is a diminished sense of the ways in which categories interpenetrate and illuminate
each other. And less obviously, there is a greatly intensified tendency to turn
particular categories of understanding into “forces” and “things” in their own right,
in works which, because they are constructed within a categorical boundary, are
never strengthened and complicated by challenges from other traditions. Having lost
the certainties of the old “Voice-of-God” narrative voice, we confront the prospect of
a total relativism, in which an account from one universe of interpretation is
completely separate from (and consequently is never challenged by) those coming
from outside.
If these risks are very generally experienced across the field of history, and have
given rise to a wide and complex literature, they have a particular bearing on the
writing of the history of Atlantic Canada. A problem of much of the new social
history, from the 1960s on, in both its “neo-Marxist” and “post-Marxist” variants, is
that it does not allow for the construction of “Canada” itself as a central category of
analysis. We seem to arrive at an interpretive impasse. One can either refuse the new
insights into the complexity of identity and the manifold determinations of “the
social” and issue various calls for “law and order” in the academy; or one can simply
dismiss as passé any discontent with fragmentation and learn to live without the
existence of any “general readers” for whom one used to write. And if this is the case
with “Canadian history”, it is perforce (and perhaps even more radically) the case with
“Atlantic Canadian history”. Why even have a field of Atlantic Canadian history, if
“Atlantic Canada” is an empty space upon which we multiply our incompatible and
incommensurate stories?
My (very tentative) answer to this impasse in the case of Canadian history is to
suggest the abandonment of the metaphor of synthesis and to encourage a strategy of
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reconnaissance. That is, I think it is neither desirable nor possible to produce a
Canadian historical “synthesis” in which every Canadian will somehow see him- or
herself as part of a great integrated story. That is a mirage, and it is time to let it go.
Rather than beginning with the ambition of synthesis, we could begin with the more
modest goal of using both the new tools of cultural theory and the old tools of political
narrative and economic analysis to illuminate specific and well-defined issues. In this
more problem-centred, bridge-building approach, to “rethink Canada” does not mean
to synthesize and integrate all Canadian experience into a universally acceptable
account, but rather to map Canada’s logical and historical conditions of possibility as
a specific project in a specific time and place.
That project, very briefly, was the project of liberal order, a coherent attempt to
install a liberal public philosophy and practice of “peace, order and good government”
in northern North America — a programme derived largely from Britain but
influenced also by the American example and by North American social realities.
Canada was thus a process, not a self-evident thing, and the key to this process was
liberalization: the drive to make certain specific and historically contingent
assumptions about human beings and their societies natural, obvious,
“commonsensical” — in a (loaded) word, “hegemonic”. In the absence of any deep
geographical or ethnic “foundations”, the Canadian state did acquire original and
distinctive features, and it gradually came to invent traditions and discourses that were
similar to but also distinct from those in other places. Liberal hegemony in Canada
was secured against entrenched enemies, difficult challenges, an enormous
geography, the pressures of other national projects: each of these in turn would subtly
influence the project of Canada. Let us also keep in mind that the liberal order in
Canada was ineradicably shaped and changed by those who opposed it; the extension
of its hegemony across North America was a dramatic, revolutionary, contested,
difficult and contingent process, and it remains so today.
What has this got to do with Atlantic Canada? Everything. A well-traveled
polemical path, pursued by both sides in our country’s rather mediocre history wars,
has been to lump in “regionalists” with all those other — feminist, working-class,
multicultural — pesky scholars who have so fecklessly undermined the old ways of
understanding Canada. The issue is surely far more complicated. Should “Canada”
disappear as a category of analysis and as the focus of historical inquiry, many
important traditions of “regional inquiry” will evaporate right along with it. Contrary
to the myth-symbol complex of the old Toronto School, which still casts its shadow
across our historiographical landscape, regional scholarship (and “regionalism” as a
sentiment) was not summoned forth by the 1960s vogue for “limited identities”; one
can surely say that it had arisen along with “national history” from the 1920s on.
Much of the drive to write the history of the region, from the days of Harold Innis,
S.A. Saunders, D.C. Harvey and J.B. Brebner, was implicitly to fit the region within
larger national or continental frameworks. Thus to be lining up the “regionalists” as
one more “balkanizing faction” in the history wars seems theoretically and
empirically mistaken.
At the same time, from the 1960s on, there were convergences between regional
history and social history. Besides obvious overlaps in approach, such as that of
working-class historians piecing together “regional patterns”, there was a sense in
which a regionalist could only sympathize with a skepticism about the nationalist
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master-narrative, which had so often peripheralized or marginalized topics located in
“Atlantic Canada”. Moreover, it seemed much more plausible, in certain areas, to
theorize beyond one’s community or group-based evidence to a regional level of
analysis. In the case of certain ethnic groups, such as Blacks and Acadians, for
example, there was an empirically strong case to be made for a regional framework of
analysis as one that reflected the defining peculiarities of a particular group beyond
the purely local level.
But this means that, in the contemporary civil war within Canadian history,
regional historians are left in a most difficult position. On the one hand they share the
sense that the “abolition” of Canada as a topic also means the “abolition” of many of
the traditional concerns of “the region”. On the other hand they would also resist any
attempt to return to the days when a small number of middle-class men, resident in
Toronto, told the story of the inevitability and goodness of the development of
Canada. We should add to this the sheer difficulty of articulating “region” as the
object of a social-scientific or historical discourse: “region” as a concept, and
“Atlantic Canada” as an application of that concept, were weakly articulated, and they
were easy subjects for “deconstruction” even before the term had been invented. One
cannot help but notice that most of the papers at this Atlantic Canada Workshop are
not about a region called “The Maritimes” or “Atlantic Canada”, but are rather about
the fit between international conceptual frameworks and the experience of “place”.
Ernest Forbes’s brilliant dissection of the way in which the “frontier myth” in
Canadian history cast the Maritimes in the role of the backward, stagnant “Other” to
the vibrant, expanding west was a pathbreaking piece — an anticipatory act of
deconstruction — which should eventually call forth many more such attempts to
piece together the way in which “region” has functioned in the imagined Canadian
community.2 The person undertaking such a deconstructive reading today would be
more challenged, since the evaporation of “region” as a category in the writing of
much Canadian social and cultural history means that one must dig, not for candid
illustrations of regional stereotyping, but rather for a more subtle language of
exclusion and hierarchy.
In Mariana Valverde’s The Age of Light, Soap and Water: Moral Reform in
English Canada, 1885-1925,3 for example, we are introduced to the “Toronto-Ottawa
axis”, and to an “English Canada” that can be meaningfully extended, without
significant institutional breaks, back from today to the 1920s. In this pioneering work,
which deservedly won widespread praise for its courageous introduction of a new
methodology, one experiences a certain vertigo of placelessness. We find ourselves
somewhere in Ontario, within an “axis”; it seems that when we grasp a part, we grasp
the (vaguely limned) whole. This ambitious use of the trope of synecdoche is highly
characteristic of the historiographical temper of our age, which is simultaneously
drawn to the very particular — this speech, this metaphor, increasingly this murder
Acadiensis92
2 E.R. Forbes, “In Search of a Post-Confederation Maritime Historiography, 1900-1967”, Acadiensis,
VIII, 1 (Autumn 1978), pp. 3-21; reprinted in Forbes, Challenging the Regional Stereotype: Essays
on the 20th Century Maritimes (Fredericton, 1989).
3 Mariana Valverde, The Age of Light, Soap and Water: Moral Reform in English Canada, 1885-1925
(Toronto, 1991).
trial — as an instance of the massively general — patriarchy, chivalry, racism and so
on. Yet how do we know that we have grasped such abstract forces without a sense
of their typicality within a country or, more feasibly given the constraints under
which we all work, within a region? It could well be that the writing of Atlantic
Canadian history has been skewed by being so placed within this axiological
framework. What if, for many purposes, the more pertinent “axis” for Atlantic
Canadians was the Boston-Halifax axis — for we have only begun to explore the fact
that, from the early 19th century, the region lay in the shadow of the second most
densely industrialized society on the globe? Where were we? Perhaps not long, and
not decisively, in “Canada” as the Ontario social historians have so insistently, but
narrowly, defined it.4
Canadian religious historiography, to suggest a further example, has deeply
internalized a model of the “evangelical century” and of the elaboration of the “social
gospel” at the edge of the industrial frontier: when a clergyman speaks in Toronto, his
voice echoes throughout the Dominion. Canadian intellectual historiography has been
seized with the rather pleasing illusion — but it is an illusion — that words spoken by
professors at Queen’s University resound from coast to coast. It no doubt reflects my
own bias when I say that Canadian working-class history, so much of which has been
shaped at the University of New Brunswick, Dalhousie and Memorial, has been far
more aware of region and far more “inclusive” than other fields. Nonetheless, even
here, one is often presented with narratives of the rise, consolidation and re-
structuring of “the Canadian working class” which work to naturalize rather
homogeneous time-lines according to an Ontario logic (and when it comes to the
startlingly different Nova Scotia evidence, treats this as simply “exceptional” or
“surplus”). Reading beyond the discipline of history, one finds many additional
examples of the ambitious use of the “trope of synecdoche”. Linda Hutcheon in As
Canadian as . . . possible . . . under the circumstances developed an interesting case
of a “doubled Canadian voice”, that of the forked tongue of irony, by explicitly
acknowledging that she was referring to the “pluricultural entity known (somewhat
reductively) as English Canada”. Then, ironically enough, in a vintage case of
nationalist reconscription, she retrospectively rebaptises Thomas Haliburton as a
Canadian in her exploration of a single “English Canadian culture”.5 Among political
scientists, particularly within the vast industry which today probes the never-ending
“constitutional crisis”, a well-established trope has been that of the “dream undone”,
the Canadian “nation” founded in 1867 undone by the pettiness of the provinces and
racked by regionalism, not to mention by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,
whom Eugene Forsey referred to as the wicked stepfathers of Confederation who took
up the task of “turning the constitution largely inside out”. (That more recent
scholarship has shown that Ontario politicians themselves undid the “dream”, and did
so precisely in the name of a more powerful and equitable realization of the liberal
project, is surely somewhat inconvenient). Or we can turn to Jeffrey Simpson’s well-
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regarded volume on patronage, with its breathtakingly simplistic view of a west-to-
east pattern of ascending political sleaze in Canada, an almost uncanny repetition of
precisely the regional stereotypes Ernest Forbes so deftly punctured.6
My point, then, is that we do not confront a situation today in which “regionalists”
are on one side or the other of Canadian history’s civil war. We are caught in the
middle. And in many respects, one regrets to say, many social and cultural historians
have gone Donald Creighton one better: at least the commercial empire of the St.
Lawrence was explicitly and candidly about a process of extending imperial control,
whose ethnic and geo-political assumptions were out in the open. With this new
literature, which wears its socialist populism on its sleeve, one often feels one is
reading a new and improved version of the same old script, this time with a cast of
millions.
I could, like many other regional historians, go on in this vein for hours. I am sure
many of us in this room have well-stocked backpacks full of examples. No doubt
many of us have voiced like complaints in public or private. What we may wish to
reflect on is how little impact such objections, even when well-founded, seem to have.
They are all so easily brushed aside, as so much “detail” that disrupts the crucial task
of synthesis; or as sheer negativity; or as parochialism. The deep historiographical
naturalization of “Canada”, its boundaries, power relations and institutions, stems in
part from the traditional proximity of scholars to the state, which (like any state)
rewards its friends and not its enemies. It also flows from the enormous wealth of
Ontario’s cultural apparatus, which is still able to fund an increasingly
disproportionate number of research scholars in graduate schools, and from the
cumulative impact of the pragmatic decisions these scholars must often make when
doing research at Ontario universities (better to drop costly plans for long-distance
research and concentrate on sources closer to home). As a consequence, the
monographs spill out in an immense wave from Ontario and Quebec, quite out of
proportion to Central Canada’s demographic or cultural weight over the long run of
Canadian and British North American history.
But beyond such practical considerations lies the strength with which Canadian
scholars have embraced “Canada” as their unproblematic and hence, in a way,
unexaminable “imagined community”, which they feel called upon to celebrate, even
if only in “reading back” and eternalizing beyond the 1940s such concepts as
nationalism, citizenship, liberal democracy and so on. The country’s actual status as
a British Dominion recedes in memory; the territorial extension of a liberal empire to
the High Arctic, to Newfoundland and Labrador, to the distant reaches of the North
Pacific is presented teleologically as the obvious and inevitable unfolding of a destiny.
Such question-begging assumptions not only demean and marginalize those — such
as the ultramontanes and nationalists in Quebec and the resistant First Nations — who
did not have the good grace to realize the inevitability and goodness of the Canadian
project; but it also trivializes the project itself, rendering both the obstacles it
confronted and its often ingenious hegemonic strategies invisible. It is one thing to
demand of Canadian historians that they ought to include a few more Atlantic
Canadian examples in their books — that, say, Ramsay Cook and R. Craig Brown, in
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their classic Canada: A Nation Transformed, might have found room for just one
chapter on the Atlantic Region as a logical complement to their chapters on other
regions.7 It is quite another thing to demand of Canadian historians that they change
the ways in which, for six decades, they have “narrated the nation”, and to urge that
they have, in many respects, mistaken imperial realities for national dreams. In
archaizing a novel and important new state-form, they have, ironically, robbed it of
much of its contemporary interest.
Where do the concepts of “region” and “regionalism” fit into this reconceptualized
approach to Canadian history? Quite centrally. But let us first consider what
approaches to “region” and to “regionalism” would not fit, at least not as they are
conventionally treated, within this notion of Canada as a relatively new nation and as
the continuation of a 19th-century liberal project.
First, one would largely dispense with attempts to define “region” in natural
essentialist terms. That it has often been so defined is a matter of record. The notion
of the “Maritime Provinces” — when was this interesting term lodged in Canadian
discourse? — seeks to define the region according to its intrinsic essence: the sea.
This has been a favourite staple of texts and tourist-trade books; and on occasion the
insistence that all “Maritimers” should have a mystic bond with the sea has had its
humorous side. (Alan MacEachern, in his thesis on the region’s national parks, in
itself a wonderful example of the invention of Canada as a “natural entity” in the 20th
century, documents various instances in which politicians in the region designated
park-worthy settings in the interior of provinces, only to encounter the objection of
the Ottawa planners: by definition, and as a matter of course, a national park in the
Maritimes must be by the sea! And, until the 1960s, all of them dutifully were).8
Without recourse to ultra-relativism, one can say that the boundaries of the region
have shown a disquieting tendency not to behave like permanent fixtures on the
landscape. They are socio-political boundaries. Even the definition of the region
provided in the first issue of Acadiensis, surely the most authoritative place to look for
certainty on this issue, was somewhat amorphous:
Devoted to focusing regional awareness, [this] journal will concentrate upon
Atlantic Canada, but will include within its geographic scope not only the
Maritime Provinces and Newfoundland but also Gaspesia and Maine with
further extensions into Central Canada and Northern New England when
these seem relevant. Regional in its approach, Acadiensis welcomes
American studies that enrich our understanding of communities on both
sides of the American-Canadian border. European studies that impinge upon
the development of the Atlantic region are within the scope of the journal.9
There is, one notes, no actual definition of the “region” designated by the phrase
“Atlantic region”, and there is the implicit suggestion that the Gaspé and Maine are at
least within its penumbra.
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In the actual practice of the journal, however, “Atlantic Canada” has been treated
rather differently than this implied definition, both more narrowly and more broadly.
It has been treated more narrowly in that the largest single part of the Atlantic
Provinces has gone virtually undiscussed: Labrador, whose land-mass is greater than
that of the island of Newfoundland and, indeed, that of the other provinces combined,
has almost never been discussed in the pages of the journal, and in fact figures very
little, if at all, in the imagined region most “Atlantic Canadians” think they live in.
Defined in terms of the territorial claims of an expansionist Canadian project, the
region’s borders have shifted quite considerably, aided in part by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council (whose settlement of the Quebec/Labrador boundary
issue may or may not hold up should Quebec attain independence), and in part of
course by the extension of Confederation to the tenth province in 1949. It was only
then, I suspect, that the phrase “Atlantic Canada” came into common usage,
displacing such older terms as “the Lower Provinces” (very common in the 19th
century). What very likely began as a census category has since been naturalized as a
regional inevitability and a focus of identity. It is for this very reason — that the term
was an Ottawa invention, which imposes a top-down homogenization on historically
distinct experiences — that the name has also been resisted. (On the other hand, in
Ontario, one often encounters a nomenclature that lumps all four provinces together
as part of the “Maritimes”). There is also the question of Canada’s sovereignty over
coastal waters, which did not extend the boundaries of the provinces, but certainly
changed the futures of many who lived within them. Attempts to define the region
“commonsensically” in terms of widely-acknowledged and shared geographical
features, stable boundaries and “ethnic essences” do not appear very promising in the
light of a history of such boundary revision and in the face of a population ranging
from the Inuit in the far North to the New England-descended population of the far
South. Tracing this “naturalization” of the region in a more sustained and historical
way could provide a researcher with some fascinating insights into how humans
imagine geographies and, over time, turn these imaginings into real lines drawn upon
the land. It would also provide insights into the ways in which this “natural definition
of region” was the complement of, perhaps even the response to, simultaneous
Canadian-nationalist attempts to find a natural warrant for the nation-state in the
Canadian Shield (canonized by the Group of Seven), the St. Lawrence River Valley
or (more abstractly) in the east-west axis that Canadian nationalists hold so dear.
A second, somewhat different if related take on the “region”, is one we might term
the “structural-functionalist” one. By this we designate not one theory or approach in
particular, but a collection of approaches that bear a family resemblance to each other.
In such discussions, the “region” is defined as the subordinate and inferior term of a
binary opposition: the “periphery” to a “centre”, a “hinterland” to a “heartland”, an
“internal colony” to a “metropole”. The Atlantic Region comes to be defined largely
in terms of its structuring absences: its lack of a metropolis, its lack of domestic pools
of capital, its lack of a well-developed industrial base, its lack of a “developed class
structure”.
Heartland/hinterland models, developed particularly by such scholars as Graeme
Wynn and Larry McCann, have offered tools to describe the evolving regional
geography of Canada. In this non-Marxist version of the theme, regions were seen to
interact with each other, economically, socially, culturally and politically. Both
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heartland — generally meaning the Windsor-Quebec City corridor — and hinterland
are distinguished by the functions they play within a more general structure: the
heartland creates a demand for staple commodities, supplying the hinterland with
“capital, labour, technology, and entrepreneurship, those factors of production which
are so essential for the initial growth and sustained development of the hinterland”.
And because the source of demand rests at the centre, the periphery is dependent on
the centre not only for supplies of capital or technical expertise, for example, but also
for patterns of living, social organization and well-being. The theoretical implication
is clear: power is mainly the preserve of the heartland.
The Marxist variant of the theory bore some resemblance to this theorization. It too
offered a “polarized theory of growth”, underlining the unevenness of capitalist
development and the extent to which it required areas of high unemployment to
provide the “light infantry” of capital. This idea was articulated in Restructuring and
Resistance, a book edited by Bryant Fairley, Colin Leys and James Sacouman, and in
many respects a continuation of the discussion advanced earlier by Brym and
Sacouman’s seminal Underdevelopment and Social Movements in Atlantic Canada:
Capitalist expansion nationally and continentally has been accompanied by
crisis and collapse in the Atlantic region’s economy. The offsetting factor has
been the growth of the welfare state, a creature of the redistributive fiscal
powers of the federal government. The Atlantic region gradually became a
dependency, to the point where economic, social and political stability now all
depend on the flow of federal dollars. With the exception of a few multinational
corporate enclaves, capitalism within the region is itself largely dependent on
state subsidies and transfers, and on the aggregate demand generated directly or
indirectly by state expenditures on goods and services. . . .10
These structural-functional realities entail certain consequences for classes within the
region:
Petty producers and workers in primary industries have occupied a central
place in the struggle against economic decline in the Atlantic region largely
because of the importance of their industries to what remains of the regional
economic base. To some degree, the pre-eminence of primary industries is
symptomatic of the underdevelopment of the region: i.e., of the failure of
both local and outside capital to generate significant levels of secondary
manufacturing activity. On balance, however, these industries are key to the
regional economy because they enjoy certain comparative advantages
relative to competitors nationally and internationally. The problem of
underdevelopment is therefore in large part a function of the failure to build
on this base.11
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It would take me far beyond my remit to go into these paradigms in detail; in the
latter case, the “development of underdevelopment”, “dependency” and “dependent
development” approaches sustained a large and heterogeneous literature, down to
about 1990, that really calls out for a major interpretive monograph. My impression
— and I stand to be corrected — is that over the past decade this approach has become
less prominent. It is certainly noteworthy that the word “underdevelopment” does not
figure in any of this year’s conference presentations. I would hazard the speculation
that both approaches have come to seem dated by the very air of structuralist
scientificity that once gave them credibility. In the case of heartland/hinterland, it did
not appear that the paradigm could yield consistent results. It was conceded that,
because hinterlands shipped many staple commodities directly to foreign customers,
the heartland depended on the periphery; but once this concession was made, the
identity of the polarities described by the theory seemed to be unstable.12 As for the
second, it underwent volleys of theoretical and empirical critique from within as well
as outside Marxist circles.13 (For many, its diagnosis of a process of capitalism
requiring the permanent exile of a global periphery to conditions of dependence was
undermined by the emergence of new economic powers in Asia).
For my part, I still find this literature offers us compelling metaphors and
descriptions for real regional problems, without perhaps giving us specifically focused
interpretations and explanations. Additionally, I would venture to wonder if there was
not a certain tendentious economism and reductionism in certain elements of this
tradition. This was particularly evident in Restructuring and Resistance, when it came
to discussing the position of subaltern classes outside the “classic proletariat”: “In
general, the question was raised of how the political potential of any social movement
of this kind is to be assessed. The fact that it enjoys widespread support from small
independent producers (farmers, fishers, lumber producers and the like) does not
necessarily mean that it is actually or potentially anti-capitalist, let alone socialist. It
is at least as likely that it will be populist, i.e. defending essentially pre-capitalist
values in the name of ‘the people’, but having a very garbled class base, lacking a
clear political analysis, and hence being prone to come to nothing (or even to come to
serve capitalist purposes)”.14 One pauses over that word “garbled”, especially as
applied not to a discourse but to a base, and indeed over the entire passage, which
conveys vividly the sense of the Marxist theoretician, at the control panel of history,
engaged in a constant assessment of which class can be considered the bearer of
historical reason, listening for correct answers and hearing only things which are
unintelligible or devoid of lasting political potential.
The themes of dependency, underdevelopment and metropolis/hinterland
interaction have been descriptively rich, and I have been complicit in their
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development myself. I think, however, that the next step for this literature is to
undergo the rigorous analysis of concepts, the de-ontologization of its categories and
the sharpening of its sense that determinist metaphors can force both analysis and
politics into an impasse. It is time for such discussions to become more historically
specific and contextual. Consider, for example, how many times we have heard of the
catastrophe of the 1920s and 1930s. True enough, in its way: the statistics are there,
and no one would argue that the coal and steel industries were not crisis-ridden. Yet
think also of the great transformation of the regional economy in precisely this
decade: the rise of Irving, the expansion of pulp and paper, the triumph of tourism, the
aggressive entry of the state into everything from road paving to hotel management.
This would not seem to be a straightforward story of a hinterland deprived of agency,
but a more complicated one, one of whose important themes is the rise of a new
service capitalism. By focusing only on the dire master narrative of the region’s fall
into dependence, we have missed many interesting other stories about enterpreneurs
and others who saw potential in crises.
A third resource upon which one might draw for a reconsidered late-20th-century
defence of both “region” and “regionalism” is, of course, the tradition of Canadian
national historiography itself and its attempt to elaborate a myth-symbol complex
adequate to the needs of a people undertaking the (possibly impossible) task of
inventing themselves as a nation in the mid-20th-century. Insofar as this has involved
the effacement of what is distinctive and rich about the history of the Maritimes, and
later Atlantic Canada, this “nationalizing” historiography is simply to be resisted.
When the region and its people are “Othered” in this nationalist historiography, when
they are reduced to quaint, patronage-ridden, backward obstacles or simply seen as a
“problem of regional disparity”, we should query these discursive “terms of trade”,
this reduction of what we know to be a rich complexity to one inferior term in a binary
opposition. These gestures of superiority, on behalf of a metropolis that never has
been and never will be accorded the cultural prestige of a true metropolis are simply
gestures of its weakness. For it is not at all clear that either Montreal or Toronto has
ever really suffused the region with new ideas, with a genuine hegemonic presence
involving both consent and domination, philosophical inspiration and political
pragmatism, or that in this much more complex cultural sense either metropole, before
the 1930s, ever served to integrate the Atlantic Region into a more general socio-
political project.
Within the project of inventing a mid-20th-century Canada, Atlantic Canadians
have often been the most grounded, cogent and sustained Canadian nationalists. They
have invested lives and hopes in this experiment, and without them “left liberalism”
as a Canadian option would have been infinitely weaker. They number, uncredited
and unstudied, as among the most articulate and important exponents of a general
welfare state (one thinks not just of Norman McLeod Rogers, but also, at least in the
1930s, of Angus L. Macdonald; and not just of William Coaker’s detailed manifesto
for the fishers, but also of J.R. Smallwood’s admittedly inconsistent embrace of a
“developmental liberalism”). Were one arrogant enough to suggest a new agenda for
regional studies, one leading item would surely be this: to explore the remarkable
extent to which Atlantic Canadians built the Canadian liberal project, and continue to
sustain it; the extraordinary depth and subtlety of the Atlantic political tradition,
generating organic intellectual after organic intellectual of the progressive liberal
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order. In telling this fundamentally important story, the notion that these are simply
“peripheral” ideas from “peripheral figures” is threadbare. From the 1930s (and
perhaps building on older traditions of responsibility) an articulate Atlantic Canadian
critique of an unrestrained neo-liberalism was the premise of much that is called
“regionalism”. Nourished by a grounded sense of the power and the centrality of
“community” and “solidarity” as counterweights to liberal individualism and the
market, drawing from the immense power of something lived rather than something
merely studied, these Atlantic critics of modernity seem to have had an inner strength,
a sense of being right. Often when we read accounts of underdevelopment, patronage
and dependency we come away with a sense of the sordidness and triviality of
Atlantic politics; it is often so, too, when we read certain works of political scientists,
who dote on the region’s corruption, venality and conservatism. But these somewhat
trivial treatments miss a good deal of what is distinctive about regional politics. From
this region, time and again, has come a subtle, complex, communitarian critique of the
liberal order. This is in fact one of the region’s defining historical characteristics.
There is also the socio-cultural sense of region. Again, let us begin with refusals.
The reduction of Atlantic Canadians to a species of Folk, to “unspoiled peasants”, and
the reduction of the region to a “playground”, a therapeutic space wherein the tired
businessmen of Canada could recover their energies: these were all rather unsubtle
and reductionist ways of thinking “region”. To this day, and especially in Ontario, one
repeatedly encounters the primitivist stereotype of the region, now “Othered” less
condescendingly, yet in ways no less objectifying and demeaning than the stereotypes
which Forbes demolished. Insofar as regional culture has meant the generation for the
Tourist Gaze of reassurances, therapeutic spaces and Folk cultures, it needs — on
ethical and political grounds — to be resisted.
When we read accounts of the “natural region”, with its essences of sea, flora and
fauna; when we read structural-functionalist accounts of the “dependent and
underdeveloped region”, with their sense of finality and objectivity; when we read of
the “political region”, that space of patronage and small deals in small places; when
we (or our impressionable students) read of all this, we perhaps inevitably feel . . . not
angry, but depressed. I remember teaching Atlantic Canadian Sociology at Saint
Mary’s University in the early 1980s. We worked through all the readily available
texts on underdevelopment and dependency. Many of these writings worked to create
a sense of finality; every moment of resistance was autopsied, and when the autopsy
was concluded, the verdict was clear: the region stood condemned. I felt that, at the
end of the class, there was a palpable sense of “no option” in the air: no option, that
is, but to leave. Not what I had intended, not what the accumulated weight of critical
theory and our “dependency readings” had intended: but there it was. . . .
Looking back, I think I would said to my despondent students that, yes, there is
much that speaks of determinism and of finality here. There is also much that speaks
of many frameworks — heterogeneous and various, and yet somehow, in ways I
would find hard to put into words, also connected to each other — that have been
enormously creative. That movements of resistance, more difficult to create in the
Atlantic environment, have also, somehow, meant more: that they have echoed, as
inspirations and memories, through time in a way one does not find in many other
places (and certainly not in “developed” but historically forgetful Ontario). That there
is much, much more to this place and this time than an inability to live up to the model
Acadiensis100
of Other Places. That even in highly compromised forms, there is a space of irony, and
the possibility of resistance. One thinks of the extraordinary awakening, happening
just as so many of us were immersed in “dependency”, of independent voices and new
cultural forms in the region.
Perhaps this will then be the fifth and final meaning of “region” in Canadian
history. It is taking shape before our eyes. A new history of politics — focused on
political theory, ideological development and state-formation — is reshaping our
understanding of the Canadian experience; and the Atlantic Region will likely play a
central role in this research programme. There is much that seems regionally
distinctive and unifying about the emergent resistance of the region to the totalitarian
logic of global neo-liberalism. I well remember telling my disbelieving sociology
students at Saint Mary’s that, in the 1910s, this region was once a by-word for social
activism; one spoke, in Central Canadian newspapers, in tones of disparagement
about the “Bolsheviks” of the “East”. To outsiders, it often seemed an unpredictable
place, where new ideas bubbled up, unannounced, yet — when we think about them
in retrospect — deeply rooted in their place. So perhaps this will be the task that those
in quest of region in the 21st century will set themselves: Why was this region so
bounded by economics and so limited by geography nonetheless such a hot-bed of
new ideas? Why did it, against all the prognostications of neo-liberal economists and
political scientists, become the heartland of the (old but persistent) dream of a new
democracy? Perhaps therein lies the final sense of what “region” — this “region” we
construct in the present and in our heads, to capture the elusive patterns of the past —
may come to mean in our work and in our practice.
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